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Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to contrast the language of human rights 
with capabilities approach conceptualized by Amartya 
Sen and Martha Nussbaum. While capabilities approach 
is an effective way of comprehending and implementing 
the rights guaranteed to people, language of human 
rights remains the essential pre-requisite for the 
development and enhancement of people’s capabilities. 
While both these frameworks for justice operate within 
the western liberal paradigm, capabilities approach fills in 
the gaps of modern human rights discourse. The new idea 
of justice that accords a central place to human dignity 
mandates that the human rights entrenched in the 
Constitution be read as capabilities. The desperate 
vacuum that exists between the promises of law and 
realities of existence can only be bridged by 
institutionalizing a blend of rights and capabilities in the 
pursuit of justice. The paper argues that the language of 
human rights and that of capabilities ought to 
supplement and complement each other for true human 
flourishing.  
Keywords: Capabilities, Human Rights, Judiciary, Justice, Liberty 
Introduction 
Amongst the diverse theories of justice that abound the 
philosophical space, capabilities approach is a unique idea striving 
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for justice. Novelty of this theory lies in the fact that it sees injustice 
in the form of inequalities in capabilities rather than income or 
resources. The method it suggests to address this injustice is 
through enhancement of people’s capabilities (which is not restricted 
to the conventional re-distribution of income) so that they can lead 
a life which reflects true human flourishing.  
Capability refers to the ability of people to be able to effectively do 
and be what they value in their lives. The paradigm of capabilities 
suggests one way of answering the critical question of the 
philosophical world - Equality of What? Though there is no 
disagreement as to “all human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights”1 inequality continues to stare back at us.  
Different equalitarian theories of justice demand equality in diverse 
spaces: John Rawls, for instance, argues for equality in the space of 
liberty and distribution of ‘primary goods,’2 Ronald Dworkin in 
‘resources,’3 Robert Nozick argues for equality of libertarian rights 
(i.e. no one has more right to liberty than anyone else)4 and 
utilitarians in the space of everyone’s weight for utility.5
Further, in contrast to the economic criterion of advancement- the 
GNP and the GDP- capabilities approach is a more authentic 
determinant of the actual condition of people. The economic 
 
Capabilities approach instead argues that the value of equality is 
most effective in the space of ‘capabilities,’ i.e. the freedom to be 
able to be or to do what one values.  
                                                          
1 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A 
(III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948), art. 1. 
2 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).   
3  RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978). 
4 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974) (disputing the 
arguments made for equality of holdings of primary goods but Nozick too 
argues for equality of libertarian rights i.e. no one has more right to liberty 
than anyone else).  
5 AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 292 (2009) (it is interesting to note the 
presence of a ‘hidden’ egalitarianism in utilitarian philosophy as there is an 
insistence on equal weights on everyone’s utility gains in the utilitarian 
objective function). 
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criteria of advancement or the quantitative national income 
estimation supplies a grossly incomplete account of human 
flourishing because it “concentrates on the means of living as the 
end-point of investigation.” Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, while 
exploring his idea of justice tells us the inadequacy of these 
determinants: 
“There are excellent reasons for not confusing means with ends, 
and for not seeing incomes and opulence as important in 
themselves, rather than valuing them conditionally for what they 
help people to achieve, including good and worthwhile lives.”6
No doubt economic opulence and substantive freedom are closely 
related but they very often tend to diverge. This is evident from the 
fact that the extent of deprivation and impoverishment inflicted 
upon many socially disadvantaged groups in the so-called 
developed countries is comparable to their developing 
counterparts. Thus, the real determinant is, and thus must be, what 
each person is actually able to do and be in his life.
 
7
Human Rights v. Human Capabilities  
 The capabilities 
approach, thus, focuses on choice and freedom, placing the 
individual in the centre, in contrast with the other philosophical 
approaches that concentrate on subjective variables like peoples’ 
happiness or desire fulfillment, or the theoretical and practical 
approaches which have income, expenditures, consumption etc. as 
their focal point. 
Capabilities approach is seen as a species of the human rights 
approach.8
                                                          
6 Id. at 226.  
7 This understanding motivates the ‘human development approach’ which 
has shifted from the means-based perspective of GNP to focusing on 
human lives themselves. The UN Human Development Reports 
published since 1990 reflect the latter model of measuring development. 
8  MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, 
SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 284 (2006). 
 It is quite evident as the capabilities that are included in 
the list of central human capabilities carved out by Martha 
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Nussbaum9
Capabilities approach transcends the dichotomy of ‘modern 
conception of human rights’
 and the illustrations given by Amartya Sen, include 
many of the entitlements which are essentially stressed in the 
human rights movement, viz., political liberties, freedom of 
association, freedom to occupation and various economic and 
social rights. The goals of both the capabilities approach as well as 
human rights approach are essentially the same – shifting the focus 
from wealth of nations to the health of nations (in terms of a moral 
and humanist development), providing fundamental entitlements 
due to every human being that become the guiding star for 
constitutional thought within a nation and finally, paving way for 
international justice. 
Despite these broad similarities, language of capabilities cannot be 
relegated to nothing but a playful use of new words that essentially 
convey the same meaning and have the same spirit. Capabilities, 
rather, supplement the language of rights to develop a conception 
of good which solely the human rights language could not do. 
Nussbaum has provided a lucid account of the differences in these 
two ethical languages the primary arguments of which are 
presented in the following paragraphs. 
10 as “capabilities cover the terrain 
occupied by both the so-called first-generation rights (political and 
civil liberties) and the so-called second-generation rights (economic 
and social rights).”11
                                                          
9  Id. at 76-78.  
10 UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 42 (2008)  (establishing that 
the expression ‘modern conception of human rights’ is used in the light of the 
distinction between modern human rights and contemporary human rights 
made by Professor Upendra Baxi). 
11 NUSSBAUM, supra note 8 at 284. 
 The rights tradition of liberal political thought 
demarcates separate, independent and mutually exclusive spheres 
for political and civil liberties and social and economic rights. 
Rawlsian theory of justice being a part of this tradition gives lexical 
priority to liberty over economic principles and for societies at a 
lower stage of economic development, he holds that denial of 
liberty can be accepted “to enhance the quality of civilization so 
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that in due course the equal freedom can be enjoyed by all.”12 This 
understanding is premised on the anachronistic debate which 
places ‘freedom’ and ‘bread’ in conflicting, antagonistic zones and 
is suggestive of the misleading proposition that liberty is causally 
independent of economic distribution after a certain stage of 
development.13
Capabilities approach, in contrast, seeks to give human needs as 
much recognition as the human rights and hence, questions the 
fundamental basis of the traditional liberal thought. Recognizing 
the interdependence and inseparability of so called first-generation 
and second generation rights, its proponents argue that an 
adequate account of freedom of speech involves discussion of 
economic distribution (say, the distribution of education). Even if it 
can be argued that the two spheres are not interdependent, it 
cannot be denied that the freedom of speech and political freedom 
have material prerequisites, even in a developed society. People 
who are denied education are not able to exercise political speech 
in equality with the literate and educated. In Political Liberalism, 
Rawls also seems to shift from his earlier position and he 
acknowledges the interdependence of liberty on socio-economic 
factors. He concedes that the principle of equal basic liberties might 
be preceded by a principle requiring that citizen’s basic needs be 
met “at least insofar as their being met is necessary for citizens to 
understand and to be able fruitfully to exercise those rights and 
liberties.”
 
14
Further, the language of capabilities gives ‘precision’ to the 
language of rights. There are wide philosophical disagreements in 
the understanding of rights. There are still wide range of 
ambiguities about questions like what is the basis of rights 
 Capabilities approach with its focus on ‘what people 
are actually able to do and to be’ gives equal weight to liberty 
(ability to do/ not do something) as well as economic arrangements 
(which ensure that people are actually able to function in accordance 
with their liberties granted to them). 
                                                          
12 RAWLS, supra note 2 at 542.  
13 UPENDRA BAXI, RIGHT TO BE HUMAN 185-199 (1987).  
14 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 7 (1993). 
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(rationality, sentience or mere human life?), whether rights are pre-
political or artefacts of laws and institutions (just by virtue of we 
being ‘human’ or nothing but ‘non-sense upon stilts’?), who are the 
subjects of rights (individuals or groups?) etc. Besides these, there 
are many other questions which add ambiguity to the rights 
discourse. For instance, what is the relationship between rights and 
duties? If A has a right to X, then does that mean that someone has 
a duty to provide X? If yes, then who is that someone? Moreover, 
there are also disagreements on the understanding of the 
expression right to. Is it right to resources with which one may 
accomplish her plans or right to opportunities with which one can 
make choices or right to a particular level of well being? Owing to 
these blurred areas in the rights discourse, the language of central 
capabilities has the advantage “of taking clear position on these 
disputed issues, while stating clearly what the motivating concerns 
are and what the goal is.”15
However, considering that the 20th century has been the age of 
rights, it is not very easy to expect the world to free itself from the 
hegemony of the rights discourse. Thus, rather than endeavouring 
for a replacement of rights language, Nussbaum proposes that for 
rights to become more meaningful, they should instead be seen as 
capabilities. Thus, “to secure rights to citizens is to put them in a 
position of combined capability to function in that area.”
 Further, the language of capabilities 
surpasses debates of cultural and historical antecedents of rights 
and thus, is more likely to be accepted universally. 
16
                                                          
15  MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 97 (2000). 
16  Id. at 98; see also Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 273 (1997); Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Rights and 
Human Capabilities, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 21 (2007).  
 This 
would work as a movement from rhetoric to reality. In the case of 
political participation, for example, the concern would be to adopt 
effective measures so that people become truly capable of 
exercising this right, like pre-election disclosure of the candidates’ 
credentials which enables the voters to make an informed choice; a 
nominal right of political participation on paper means little for the 
capabilities theorists.  
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Viewing rights in terms of capabilities is especially important in 
case of economic and material rights. The language of capabilities 
attaches clear meaning to them. Right to shelter, for example, can 
mean a lot of different things viewed from different perspective.17 
Right to shelter could mean giving people certain amount of 
resources, it could mean securing people any shelter and 
measuring their satisfaction or it could mean looking at how people 
are actually enabled to live. Nussbaum argues that the third 
perspective to rights is the best way of analyzing rights, especially 
economic and material rights.18 Both resources–based and utility–
based analyses provide us with an incomplete picture as giving 
equal resources to differently situated people does not bring them 
to same level of capabilities to function. Similarly, utility cannot be 
an effective guide for determining if people enjoy equal rights; in a 
traditionally deprived society people may be easily satisfied with a 
standard of living which a rich person can’t even conceive of in her 
dreams. Capabilities analysis “thus enables us to set forth clearly a 
rationale we have for spending unequal amounts of money on the 
disadvantaged, or creating special programs to assist their 
transition to full capability.”19
The public–private dichotomy that is inherently entrenched in the 
traditional liberal rights discourse is also bypassed by the 
capabilities approach. Though the struggle of feminist movements 
across the globe to uncover the myth of public–private has greatly 
transformed the human rights discourse,
 
20
                                                          
17 B.B. Pande, Re-Orienting the ‘Rights’ Discourse to Basic Human Needs, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND BASIC NEEDS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 168-169 
(Mahendra P. Singh and ors. (eds.), 2008). (stating the rhetoric behind right 
to shelter in the Indian Apex Court decisions unveils the inadequacy and 
limitation of the rights language to be able to render complete justice). 
18 NUSSBAUM, supra note 15 at 99. 
19 Id. 
20 See generally Madhu Mehra, And miles to go…Challenges facing Women’s 
Human rights, 40 JOURNAL OF INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE 123 (1998).  
 the dilemma still 
persists for most states. Attempts to extend the reach of human 
rights into the small kingdoms of family are met with stiff 
resistance as the fate of Article 16 of Convention on the Elimination 
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of Discrimination Against Women, 1979 reveals. Article 16 seeks to 
eliminate discrimination in all matters relating to marriage and 
family relations. This Article has attracted most reservations from 
state parties. In Nussbaum’s list of central human capabilities, the 
threshold level of each of which should be secured to each and 
every person, the ability to move freely from place to place and 
security against sexual assault (including domestic violence) 
figures quite predominantly which strikes the very root of the 
public-private divide. Issues like marital rape which remain 
legitimised in the rights jurisdictions will have no space to breath in 
the paradigm of capabilities which treats every human being as an 
end in herself, in both her public and private life. 
In their zeal for the language of capabilities, the capabilities 
scholars have never suggested a complete supersession of the 
language of human rights. Primarily because rights are suggestive 
of justified and urgent claims that a person possesses and can 
rightfully claim against the mighty state. Capabilities, in contrast, 
still have a vagueness attached to them. Moreover, rights discourse 
is broadly the “terrain of agreement”, unlike the relatively novel 
idea of capabilities. It is, thus, easier to address and resolve the 
conflicting and ambiguous areas of that discourse, than dumping it 
for an approach, no matter how radical, which still lacks a 
unanimous and consensual backing. 
Capabilities Approach and Judicial Interpretation 
The discourse of equality becomes meaningless if it fails to clearly 
explain the space which it seeks to address and where it demands 
equality. The judiciary which is entrusted with the task of 
interpreting and defining the contours of right to equality faces this 
question as much as the policy makers but it is the question 
“equality of what” is largely ignored by it. The judicial 
interpretation of right to equality continues to be guided by the 
common-sense produced by the liberal discourse (with an obsession 
with negative liberty) and fails to integrate the interest of other 
subjects of justice. The status quoist meaning of equality guides the 
judicial interpretation as is evident from the decisions which fail to 
contextualize equality. The most recent of such unwelcome judicial 
decisions is the order in which the Supreme Court denied 
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permission to a dyslexic student to use calculator in his 
mathematics paper in the Class XII examinations conducted by the 
Central Board of Secondary Education as it was not in the Board’s 
rule book.21
There is no doubt that justice could have been done had the court 
resorted to the constitutional principle of ‘likes to be alike,’ but the 
application of the capabilities approach in the aforementioned case 
would have given an absolutely different perspective of the 
situation. The broader issue would have been of securing to the 
dyslexic student his right to be human by guaranteeing him 
facilities that enable him to live a fully human life in an otherwise 
disabled unfriendly physical and social environment. The judges 
should have asked themselves whether the dyslexic student would 
have equal opportunity to be able to do what he values (here 
mathematical calculations) as other non-dyslexic students? The 
answer would be certainly a ‘no’. The court to ensure equality 
between the students should have permitted the use of calculator 
as that would have enabled the dyslexic student to overcome his 
disability. This may prima facie appear to be unequal (for the rules 
of the examination would have had to be changed for one person), 
but if equality is seen vis-à-vis capabilities, granting him permission 
was the only way to ensure real equality. The court instead was 
 It is particularly important to note here that the form of 
power exercised by the judicial structure is not what works on 
people, it rather is what covertly works through them. It is the 
internalisation of the notion that differently abled people deserve 
sympathy/ charity and not rights that confers social legitimacy on 
such exclusionary orders. Interestingly in the aforementioned 
decision, the court chose to rely upon the formal notion of equality 
where everyone is treated equally in blatant disregard and 
ignorance of their peculiar circumstances and situations in life. This 
notion of equality (all students to be treated equally) ended up 
perpetuating inequality in reality.  
                                                          
21 Master Pranjay Jain (Minor) TR. Gaurdian v. U.O.I. & Ors. (Supreme 
Court order available at http:// courtnic.nic.in/ supremecourt/ temp/ 
dc%20852110p.txt) (stating that it is noteworthy that the I.C.S.E. board had 
been permitting students to use a calculator in the board examinations and the 
2007 national policy of the Central government also had provisions for the 
students with disability to use the calculator). 
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guided by the notion of equality in resources or equal rules for all 
students, which in effect perpetuated inequality.  
The strength of the capabilities approach lies not only in the fact 
that it truly individualizes justice, but also because it values every 
human being as an end in herself. It humanizes the rights discourse 
by including the hitherto excluded, elevating their status from 
those who deserve charity to those who are claimants of equal 
rights. Capabilities approach calls for radical changes in the 
structures - physical as well as social - of society that are made 
according to the interests and for the convenience of the dominant 
groups. Thus, capabilities approach is a better paradigm that 
ensures equality and facilitates justice. 
Conclusion 
To summarise, it would be appropriate to say that the language of 
human rights and that of capabilities ought to supplement and 
complement each other for true human flourishing. While 
capabilities approach is an effective way of comprehending and 
implementing the rights guaranteed to people, the human rights 
discourse is the essential pre-requisite for the development and 
enhancement of people’s capabilities.  Thus, the new idea of justice 
that accords a central place to human dignity mandates that the 
human rights entrenched in the Constitution be read as capabilities. 
The onus is on the judiciary to evolve such principles of 
interpretation that the focus is always directed to the end result i.e. 
what a person is able to do or be through the claims and 
entitlements of rights. The desperate vacuum that exists between 
the promises of law and realities of existence can only be bridged 
by institutionalizing a blend of rights and capabilities in the pursuit 
of justice. 
 
 
